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Monday, May 10, 2004
Sunday, May 09, 2004
Thursday, May 06, 2004
JOSE LOUIS NAVARRO, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF SOUTH GATE, a Municipal Corporation; GEORGE TROXCIL, individually; GEORGE TROXCIL, in his official capacity as Chief of Police; ALBERT CARRILLO; A. LOPEZ, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 02-55395
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
81 Fed. Appx. 192; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23421
June 4, 2003, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California
November 14, 2003, Filed
I. Fourth Amendment
The officers' failure to further investigate the possibility of self-defense -- indeed, their failure even to acknowledge the evidence in support of such a claim -- might not be fatal to their claim of qualified immunity if self-defense were merely an affirmative defense on which Navarro had the burden of proof. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) [**8] ("[A] law enforcement officer is not required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, however, Navarro was arrested for a crime that is statutorily defined so that negation of self-defense is an element of the offense on which the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Cal. Penal Code § 246.3 (West 2003); People v. Alonzo, 13 Cal. App. 4th 535, 538, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1993); California Jury Instructions, Criminal Instruction 9.03.3 (7th ed. 2003). By failing to investigate material exculpatory evidence that negated an element of the offense, the officers did not consider the totality of the circumstances, and therefore they did not act reasonably in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Navarro. n3 See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1032 ("An officer is not entitled to a qualified immunity defense ... where exculpatory evidence is ignored that would negate a finding of probable cause.").
A lack of evidence on a particular element, however, is quite a different matter from the presence of evidence that affirmatively suggests that an element cannot be met. Defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that officers may ignore exculpatory evidence on an element of the offense in making probable cause determinations.
Given the clearly established nature of both the law defining the offense at issue and the requirement that officers consider the totality of the circumstances (exculpatory as well as inculpatory), as well as the presence of strong evidence indicating that Navarro acted in self-defense, a reasonable officer would not have sought to arrest Navarro without first considering whether the discharge of the firearm was privileged. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that the officers' investigation took nearly two weeks to finish and did not present the difficulty of drawing fine legal distinctions under exigent circumstances. [*196] Cf. Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2003).
II. Eighth Amendment
Navarro next contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his two Eighth Amendment claims.
First, Navarro contends the officers submitted an inaccurate criminal history print-out, which resulted in a $ 55,000 increase in bail. We agree [**10] that a material dispute of fact would exist if Navarro had presented evidence that the inaccurate criminal history report was before the court when the court set bail. However, we find no such evidence in the record.
Navarro points only to a certified copy of the clerk's docket from Los Angeles Municipal Court. The docket notes that during the bail hearing, "[a] copy of the complaint and the arrest report [was] given to defendant's counsel." Even presuming the court also had the complaint and arrest report before it, there is no evidence that the inaccurate criminal history was attached to either of these two documents. As the district court noted, Navarro has not submitted certified copies of either the arrest report or the complaint from which we could determine their contents. Thus, Navarro has not put forth evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.
In sum, we reverse the summary judgment on Navarro's [**14] Fourth Amendment claim and remand for further proceedings. However, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on his Eighth and First Amendment claims.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
No. 02-55395
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
81 Fed. Appx. 192; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23421
June 4, 2003, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California
November 14, 2003, Filed
I. Fourth Amendment
The officers' failure to further investigate the possibility of self-defense -- indeed, their failure even to acknowledge the evidence in support of such a claim -- might not be fatal to their claim of qualified immunity if self-defense were merely an affirmative defense on which Navarro had the burden of proof. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) [**8] ("[A] law enforcement officer is not required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, however, Navarro was arrested for a crime that is statutorily defined so that negation of self-defense is an element of the offense on which the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Cal. Penal Code § 246.3 (West 2003); People v. Alonzo, 13 Cal. App. 4th 535, 538, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1993); California Jury Instructions, Criminal Instruction 9.03.3 (7th ed. 2003). By failing to investigate material exculpatory evidence that negated an element of the offense, the officers did not consider the totality of the circumstances, and therefore they did not act reasonably in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Navarro. n3 See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1032 ("An officer is not entitled to a qualified immunity defense ... where exculpatory evidence is ignored that would negate a finding of probable cause.").
A lack of evidence on a particular element, however, is quite a different matter from the presence of evidence that affirmatively suggests that an element cannot be met. Defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that officers may ignore exculpatory evidence on an element of the offense in making probable cause determinations.
Given the clearly established nature of both the law defining the offense at issue and the requirement that officers consider the totality of the circumstances (exculpatory as well as inculpatory), as well as the presence of strong evidence indicating that Navarro acted in self-defense, a reasonable officer would not have sought to arrest Navarro without first considering whether the discharge of the firearm was privileged. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that the officers' investigation took nearly two weeks to finish and did not present the difficulty of drawing fine legal distinctions under exigent circumstances. [*196] Cf. Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2003).
II. Eighth Amendment
Navarro next contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his two Eighth Amendment claims.
First, Navarro contends the officers submitted an inaccurate criminal history print-out, which resulted in a $ 55,000 increase in bail. We agree [**10] that a material dispute of fact would exist if Navarro had presented evidence that the inaccurate criminal history report was before the court when the court set bail. However, we find no such evidence in the record.
Navarro points only to a certified copy of the clerk's docket from Los Angeles Municipal Court. The docket notes that during the bail hearing, "[a] copy of the complaint and the arrest report [was] given to defendant's counsel." Even presuming the court also had the complaint and arrest report before it, there is no evidence that the inaccurate criminal history was attached to either of these two documents. As the district court noted, Navarro has not submitted certified copies of either the arrest report or the complaint from which we could determine their contents. Thus, Navarro has not put forth evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.
In sum, we reverse the summary judgment on Navarro's [**14] Fourth Amendment claim and remand for further proceedings. However, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on his Eighth and First Amendment claims.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
Tuesday, May 04, 2004
Justice-Denied.net
Without Bivens Actions, the right to hold Federal employees personally liable for malicious, vicious and even depraved actions is severely limited under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent revisions. For example, a Federal, former Federal employee or non Federal employee treated with grievous and malicious indifference, would have no recourse to file suit against the parties involved in US Federal Court. A Federal Employee would only have recourse to filing against the "Department Head," such as the Attorney General. Thus, people responsible for acts of brutality and sadism in violation of the United States Constitution, would be protected by the Federal Government. This allows for a continuation of these actions against others.
Justice-Denied.net
A Bivens claim can be based on conspiracy of federal agents by showing:
(1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive someone of constitutional rights, and
(2) an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights resulting from the agreement.
Without Bivens Actions, the right to hold Federal employees personally liable for malicious, vicious and even depraved actions is severely limited under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent revisions. For example, a Federal, former Federal employee or non Federal employee treated with grievous and malicious indifference, would have no recourse to file suit against the parties involved in US Federal Court. A Federal Employee would only have recourse to filing against the "Department Head," such as the Attorney General. Thus, people responsible for acts of brutality and sadism in violation of the United States Constitution, would be protected by the Federal Government. This allows for a continuation of these actions against others.
Justice-Denied.net
A Bivens claim can be based on conspiracy of federal agents by showing:
(1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive someone of constitutional rights, and
(2) an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights resulting from the agreement.
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10856,*;330 F.3d 1186;
2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4562;2003 Daily Journal DAR 5874
JOSE AGUADO CERVANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 01-56929
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
330 F.3d 1186;2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10856;2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4562;2003 Daily Journal DAR 5874
June 2, 2003, Filed
Although rare, on occasion, we see arguments that simply fail the straight-face test. The United States' assertion that the "detention of goods" exception to the sovereign immunity waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act applies to its negligent failure to remove 119 pounds of marijuana hidden in a car it sold to Jose Aguado Cervantes, whom it later incarcerated for "transporting" those very drugs, is one. Although we agree with the district court that Cervantes cannot recover damages for false imprisonment or false arrest because the customs agents had reasonable cause [*2] to believe his arrest was lawful, the United States' defense to his negligence claim is patently without merit. We therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing Cervantes's false imprisonment and false arrest claims, and reinstate Cervantes's negligence claim.
C. Negligence
Cervantes's claim for negligence is an entirely different matter. We are compelled to note that the United States' assertion, as its sole defense, that this claim is barred by the "detention of goods" exception is so off-the-mark as to be embarrassing. n1
2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4562;2003 Daily Journal DAR 5874
JOSE AGUADO CERVANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 01-56929
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
330 F.3d 1186;2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10856;2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4562;2003 Daily Journal DAR 5874
June 2, 2003, Filed
Although rare, on occasion, we see arguments that simply fail the straight-face test. The United States' assertion that the "detention of goods" exception to the sovereign immunity waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act applies to its negligent failure to remove 119 pounds of marijuana hidden in a car it sold to Jose Aguado Cervantes, whom it later incarcerated for "transporting" those very drugs, is one. Although we agree with the district court that Cervantes cannot recover damages for false imprisonment or false arrest because the customs agents had reasonable cause [*2] to believe his arrest was lawful, the United States' defense to his negligence claim is patently without merit. We therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing Cervantes's false imprisonment and false arrest claims, and reinstate Cervantes's negligence claim.
C. Negligence
Cervantes's claim for negligence is an entirely different matter. We are compelled to note that the United States' assertion, as its sole defense, that this claim is barred by the "detention of goods" exception is so off-the-mark as to be embarrassing. n1
28 USCS § 1346 (2004)
§ 1346. United States as defendant
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Claims Court [United States Court of Federal Claims], of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws;
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $ 10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, except that the district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the United States founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort which are subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 [41 USCS §§ 607(g)(1), 609(a)(1)]. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States.
(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [28 USCS §§ 2671 et seq.], the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
(2) No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
§ 1346. United States as defendant
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Claims Court [United States Court of Federal Claims], of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws;
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $ 10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, except that the district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the United States founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort which are subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 [41 USCS §§ 607(g)(1), 609(a)(1)]. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States.
(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [28 USCS §§ 2671 et seq.], the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
(2) No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud. Rooker-Feldman therefore does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to set aside a state court judgment obtained by that fraud.
B. Other [*15] Alleged Wrongful Acts
Kougasian's remaining four causes of action are based on other alleged wrongful acts by the defendants. All of these causes of action were previously adjudicated by the state courts in Kougasian I and/or II. Because Kougasian is attempting to have the judgments of these two courts set aside based on the alleged extrinsic fraud by defendants, however, these four causes of action are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
However, even if Kougasian were not seeking to set aside the judgments because of extrinsic fraud (or even if the federal court concludes that there was no extrinsic fraud), Rooker-Feldman still does not bar these four causes of action. Kougasian does not, in these causes of action, allege legal errors by the state courts; rather, she alleges wrongful acts by the defendants, such as negligently designing the ski run and negligently placing or failing to remove the rock. It is true that factual allegations and legal claims in these four causes of action are almost identical to the allegations and claims asserted in state court in Kougasian I and II, but that is not sufficient reason to find the causes of action barred by Rooker-Feldman [*16] .
If issues presented in a federal suit are "inextricably intertwined" with issues presented in a forbidden de facto appeal from a state court decision, Rooker-Feldman dictates that those intertwined issues may not be litigated. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. But the issues in Kougasian's four causes of action are not "inextricably intertwined" within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman. In an ordinary language sense, the issues in Kougasian's claims are indeed "inextricably intertwined" with the issues in Kougasian I and II. But, as we explained in Noel v. Hall, "inextricably intertwined" has a narrow and specialized meaning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1166.
B. Other [*15] Alleged Wrongful Acts
Kougasian's remaining four causes of action are based on other alleged wrongful acts by the defendants. All of these causes of action were previously adjudicated by the state courts in Kougasian I and/or II. Because Kougasian is attempting to have the judgments of these two courts set aside based on the alleged extrinsic fraud by defendants, however, these four causes of action are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
However, even if Kougasian were not seeking to set aside the judgments because of extrinsic fraud (or even if the federal court concludes that there was no extrinsic fraud), Rooker-Feldman still does not bar these four causes of action. Kougasian does not, in these causes of action, allege legal errors by the state courts; rather, she alleges wrongful acts by the defendants, such as negligently designing the ski run and negligently placing or failing to remove the rock. It is true that factual allegations and legal claims in these four causes of action are almost identical to the allegations and claims asserted in state court in Kougasian I and II, but that is not sufficient reason to find the causes of action barred by Rooker-Feldman [*16] .
If issues presented in a federal suit are "inextricably intertwined" with issues presented in a forbidden de facto appeal from a state court decision, Rooker-Feldman dictates that those intertwined issues may not be litigated. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. But the issues in Kougasian's four causes of action are not "inextricably intertwined" within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman. In an ordinary language sense, the issues in Kougasian's claims are indeed "inextricably intertwined" with the issues in Kougasian I and II. But, as we explained in Noel v. Hall, "inextricably intertwined" has a narrow and specialized meaning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1166.
It has long been the law that a plaintiff in federal court can seek to set aside a state court judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud. In Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80, 99 U.S. 80, 25 L. Ed. 407 (1878), the Supreme Court distinguished between errors by the state court, which could not be reviewed in federal circuit court, and fraud on the state court, which could be the basis for an independent suit in circuit court. (The federal circuit court was [*13] a trial court at that time.) Anticipating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court wrote:
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A. Alleged Extrinsic Fraud
Three of Kougasian's causes of action are based, in whole or in part, on alleged extrinsic fraud on the state court. n1 The alleged extrinsic fraud primarily consisted of submitting the false declaration to the state court in Kougasian I at the last minute and refusing to supply the telephone number or address of the declarant, thereby preventing Kougasian from deposing or otherwise questioning him. "Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court. [*11] " Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981). Under California law, extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. See Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., 28 Cal. 4th 249, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Cal. 2002).
Lexis-Nexis
Three of Kougasian's causes of action are based, in whole or in part, on alleged extrinsic fraud on the state court. n1 The alleged extrinsic fraud primarily consisted of submitting the false declaration to the state court in Kougasian I at the last minute and refusing to supply the telephone number or address of the declarant, thereby preventing Kougasian from deposing or otherwise questioning him. "Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court. [*11] " Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981). Under California law, extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. See Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., 28 Cal. 4th 249, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Cal. 2002).
Lexis-Nexis
Kougasian alleges seven [*6] causes of action. In one of the causes of action, she seeks to set aside the state court judgments in Kougasian I and II, alleging that the defendants obtained those judgments through extrinsic fraud on the court. The allegations supporting her cause of action for extrinsic fraud also support two other causes of action in which she seeks damages for fraud and abuse of process. Kougasian particularly emphasizes the allegedly false declaration submitted in Kougasian I, upon which she partially relied in her complaint in Kougasian II. Kougasian alleged none of these three causes of action in her complaints in Kougasian I and II. In her remaining four causes of action, Kougasian seeks damages based on wrongful death, premises liability, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Kougasian alleged these same four causes of action in Kougasian I and/or II.
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